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I. INTRODUCTION
The endorsement test, first explained by Justice O’Connor in her Lynch
v. Donnelly1 concurrence and adopted by the Court in County of Allegheny v.
ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter,2 provides one way to determine whether
state action violates Establishment Clause guarantees. Now that Justice
O’Connor has retired, there is some question whether the endorsement test
will survive. Despite commentators’ claims to the contrary, however, there
is no reason to think that the endorsement test retired along with Justice
O’Connor, although a separate issue is whether those on the Court using the
test will do more than give occasional lip service to the interests and

* Trustees Professor of Law, Capital University Law School, Columbus, Ohio. This Article is
a part of Pepperdine University School of Law’s February 2012 conference entitled, The Competing
Claims of Law and Religion: Who Should Influence Whom?
1. 465 U.S. 668, 687–95 (1984).
2. 492 U.S. 573, 574 (1989).
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perspectives of minority religious groups.3 At this point, the most likely
scenario is that the Court will sometimes use the test,4 but will be unlikely to
use it to strike down a particular practice.
Part II of this Article discusses the development of the endorsement test
during the period that Justice O’Connor was on the Court, noting some of
the ambiguities in the test’s formulation and application. Part III of this
Article discusses how the test has been used in two cases since Justice
O’Connor’s retirement, noting that the way that the test has been used after
Justice O’Connor’s retirement mirrors the way that it was used while she
was still on the Court. The Article concludes that the test is likely to remain
one of the tests used by the Court to determine whether Establishment
Clause guarantees have been violated—the test will retain its potential to
assure that individuals will not be treated as second-class citizens because of
their religious beliefs but will in reality pay mere lip service to religious
minorities’ sincere reactions to a variety of practices privileging some
religions over others and privileging religion over non-religion.
II. THE BIRTH AND EVOLUTION OF THE ENDORSEMENT TEST
The endorsement test has been evolving since its inception in the 1980s.
At first, the test seemed to have great promise, because it was designed to
prevent the government from acting in ways that would make religious
minorities feel like second-class citizens.5 While the test as applied did not
always fulfill its potential, it at least seemed much more protective than
other possible tests.6 Regrettably, the test is sometimes used in ways that not
only fail to protect religious minorities, but also implicitly cast aspersions
upon some of the very people whom it is designed to protect.7
3. See Adam M. Samaha, Endorsement Retires: From Religious Symbols to Anti-Sorting
Principles, 2005 SUP. CT. REV. 135, 140 (“With the departure of Justice O’Connor—the author and
most committed supporter of the endorsement notion—there is a good chance that the test will retire
along with her. In fact, because the test is so keyed to judicial perception, a change in personnel
almost necessarily changes the rule.”).
4. Even after the text had been adopted and Justice O’Connor was still on the Court, the test
was only sometimes used. See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992) (striking down
graduation benediction as violation of Establishment Clause guarantees against coercion).
5. Mark Strasser, The Protection and Alienation of Religious Minorities: On the Evolution of
the Endorsement Test, 2008 MICH. ST. L. REV. 667, 668.
6. See Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 627–28 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
An Establishment Clause standard that prohibits only “coercive” practices or overt efforts
at government proselytization, . . . but fails to take account of the numerous more subtle
ways that government can show favoritism to particular beliefs or convey a message of
disapproval to others, would not, in my view, adequately protect the religious liberty or
respect the religious diversity of the members of our pluralistic political community.
Id. (internal citation omitted).
7. Strasser, supra note 5, at 668.
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A. Lynch and the Birth of the Endorsement Test
The endorsement test first appeared in a concurrence written by Justice
O’Connor in Lynch v. Donnelly.8 The Lynch Court upheld a holiday display
in a public park in Pawtucket, Rhode Island, and Justice O’Connor claimed
that her endorsement test was both compatible with the Court’s decision and
with the prevailing Establishment Clause jurisprudence.9
The Christmas display at issue included, among other things, reindeer
pulling Santa’s sleigh, a Christmas tree, an elephant, a teddy bear, candystriped poles, and a crèche.10 The constitutional challenge was to the
inclusion of the crèche in particular.11
To assess whether that inclusion involved an impermissible promotion
of religion, the Lynch Court examined some of the previous practices that
had passed constitutional muster.12 Concluding that the crèche’s inclusion
did not promote religion any more than did the practices whose
constitutionality had already been upheld, the Court held that the practice at
issue did not violate constitutional guarantees.13
Regrettably, there was something at the very least disingenuous about
the Lynch Court’s analysis. The constitutionally permissible practices that
the Lynch Court described as promoting religion had been described much
differently when the constitutionality of those very practices had been at
issue—indeed, the Court had suggested in many of the cases that the failure
to uphold the practice at issue would indicate a lack of neutrality towards
religion,14 which might be thought to indicate either “hostility toward

8. 465 U.S. 668, 687–95 (1984).
9. In his Lynch dissent, Justice Brennan suggested that the majority decision was incompatible
with the existing jurisprudence. Id. at 695 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“Despite the narrow contours of
the Court’s opinion, our precedents in my view compel the holding that Pawtucket’s inclusion of a
life-sized display depicting the biblical description of the birth of Christ as part of its annual
Christmas celebration is unconstitutional.”).
10. Id. at 671 (plurality opinion).
11. Id.
12. Id. at 675–79.
13. Id. at 681–82.
14. See, e.g., Roemer v. Bd. of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 746 (1976) (reasoning that “religious
institutions need not be quarantined from public benefits that are neutrally available to all”); Bd. of
Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 243 (1968) (“The law merely makes available to all children the
benefits of a general program to lend school books free of charge.”); Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330
U.S. 1, 18 (1947) (suggesting that the legislation at issue does “no more than provide a general
program to help parents get their children, regardless of their religion, safely and expeditiously to
and from accredited schools”).
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religion”15 or a “callous indifference” towards religion.16 At the very least,
the malleability of the implicit standard used by the Lynch Court is a cause
for concern. If the same standard could yield the conclusion that the failure
to permit certain practices would hinder or undermine religion and that
permitting those very practices would promote religion, then the standard is
either useless or, perhaps, simply providing cover for a conclusion reached
in light of a different method or standard of analysis.
In her Lynch concurrence, Justice O’Connor proposed and explicated
the endorsement test as a method for determining whether Establishment
Clause guarantees had been violated.17 She explained that the Lemon test,
sometimes used at the time to determine whether Establishment Clause
guarantees had been violated,18 should be understood to specify two different
ways in which the state might violate the relevant guarantees: (1) “excessive
entanglement with religious institutions,”19 and (2) “government
endorsement or disapproval of religion.”20 The latter, she explained, should
be understood in terms of the endorsement test.
The endorsement test precludes the government from sending a
“message to [religious] nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full
members of the political community, and an accompanying message to
adherents that they are insiders, favored members of the political
community.”21 The government is also prohibited from sending the opposite
message, such as its disapproval of religion.22
The endorsement test focuses on two distinct messages, which may but
need not coincide. One involves what the state was trying to communicate
by performing the challenged action, and the other involves the message

15. Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 673 (1970).
16. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 673. Sometimes, members of the Court accuse each other of being either
hostile or callous toward religion. See Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh
Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 610 (1989) (“Justice Kennedy repeatedly accuses the Court of harboring a
‘latent hostility’ or ‘callous indifference’ toward religion . . . .”).
17. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 687–94 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
18. For example, the Lemon test was not used in Marsh v. Chambers, in which the Court upheld
the practice of legislative prayer. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 800–01 (1983) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (“I have no doubt that, if any group of law students were asked to apply the principles of
Lemon to the question of legislative prayer, they would nearly unanimously find the practice to be
unconstitutional.”). The test was used in Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983), to uphold
Minnesota’s granting a tax deduction for expenses incurred in sending children to elementary and
secondary schools, and was used in Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985), to strike down an
Alabama law setting aside a period of silence (not to exceed a minute) at the beginning of the first
class of the day for meditation or voluntary prayer.
19. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 687–88 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
20. Id. at 688.
21. Id.
22. See id.
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actually communicated.23 If either the intended or the actual message
involves the endorsement or disapproval of religion, then the challenged
action fails the test and is unconstitutional.24
Consider how one would go about determining what a state was trying
to communicate when performing a particular action. One might examine
the express comments of those approving a particular policy.25 However, if
that were the relevant test, it would be unsurprising for many legislators to
be rather circumspect in what they would say on the record if only so that
their legislative action would be more likely to survive a constitutional
challenge.26 Indeed, one might expect legislators to expressly deny that they
were attempting to endorse certain religious views over others in an attempt
to forestall a charge of favoritism,27 although a separate issue would be
whether a court would accept the legislators’ comments at face value.28
Suppose that some legislators make clear that they support particular
legislation because they want to promote particular religious views.29 That
hardly establishes that others supporting the measure also want to promote

23. See id. at 690.
24. See id. (“An affirmative answer to either question should render the challenged practice
invalid.”).
25. See, e.g., Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
The Court stated:
Councilman Martinez, after noting his belief that Santeria was outlawed in Cuba,
questioned: “[I]f we could not practice this [religion] in our homeland [Cuba], why bring
it to this country?” Councilman Cardoso said that Santeria devotees at the Church “are in
violation of everything this country stands for.” Councilman Mejides indicated that he
was “totally against the sacrificing of animals” and distinguished kosher slaughter
because it had a “real purpose.” The “Bible says we are allowed to sacrifice an animal
for consumption,” he continued, “but for any other purposes, I don’t believe that the
Bible allows that.” The president of the city council, Councilman Echevarria, asked:
“What can we do to prevent the Church from opening?”
Id. at 541.
26. See Mark Strasser, The Invidiousness of Invidiousness: On the Supreme Court’s Affirmative
Action Jurisprudence, 21 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 323, 340 (1994) (“The Court could demand direct
evidence of illicit motivation before finding animus. This predicate would be very difficult to
establish because individuals or legislators who wished to invidiously discriminate would be
unlikely to reveal their actual motivations.” (footnote omitted)).
27. See 154 CONG. REC. E2174 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 2008) (Rep. Corrine Brown stated: “It is not
my intention by this statement to endorse one religion or religious leader over another.”).
28. See Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 648 (1975) (“But the mere recitation of a
benign, compensatory purpose is not an automatic shield which protects against any inquiry into the
actual purposes underlying a statutory scheme.”).
29. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 41 (2004) (O’Connor, J., concurring
in the judgment) (“It is true that some of the legislators who voted to add the phrase ‘under God’ to
the Pledge may have done so in an attempt to attach to it an overtly religious message.”).
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those same religious views,30 especially when the Constitution precludes
legislatures from trying to do so.31 Merely because particular individuals
wish to promote certain religious views would not itself justify imputing a
similar goal to the state. That said, however, there will be some
circumstances under which the state will be found to have a forbidden
purpose. For example, in Wallace v. Jaffree,32 the Court examined an
Alabama statute authorizing a minute of silence to begin the school day “for
meditation or voluntary prayer.”33 Because a minute of silence for
meditation was already authorized,34 the Court could discern no secular
purpose in specifying that the minute set aside could be used for voluntary
prayer as well.35
If a state will be found to intend to promote religion only in cases in
which there is no secular purpose for its action, then there will be very few
instances in which the state will be found to have an impermissible goal.36
In most cases, there will be some secular purpose that can be asserted.37
Justice O’Connor expressly rejected that the mere existence of a secular
purpose would immunize the state from the charge that it was attempting to
promote religion.38 For example, she noted that the Court had struck down
posting copies of the Ten Commandments in the public schools,39 even when
the state had some secular purposes behind doing so, for example, “instilling
most of the values of the Ten Commandments and illustrating their
connection to our legal system.”40 Thus, the relevant question is not whether

30. See id. at 25–26 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment) (“The amendment’s sponsor,
Representative Rabaut, said its purpose was to contrast this country’s belief in God with the Soviet
Union’s embrace of atheism. 100 Cong. Rec. 1700 (1954). We do not know what other Members of
Congress thought about the purpose of the amendment.”); see also Vill. of Arlington Heights v.
Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265 (1977) (“Rarely can it be said that a legislature or
administrative body operating under a broad mandate made a decision motivated solely by a single
concern, or even that a particular purpose was the ‘dominant’ or ‘primary’ one.”).
31. See United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 73 (1994) (“[W]e do not impute
to Congress an intent to pass legislation that is inconsistent with the Constitution as construed by this
Court.”).
32. 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
33. Id. at 40.
34. See id.
35. Id. at 56.
36. Cf. McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 901–02 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(suggesting that the relevant test is whether the state has any secular purpose at all).
37. See id. at 865 n.13 (discussing “the ease of finding some secular purpose for almost any
government action”).
38. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S 668, 690–91 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“That
requirement is not satisfied, however, by the mere existence of some secular purpose, however
dominated by religious purposes.”).
39. See id. at 691 (citing Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980)).
40. See id.
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there was any secular purpose at all but, instead, whether the religious
purposes “dominated.”41
After explaining some of the factors to be considered as a general matter
when seeking to uncover the state’s purposes, Justice O’Connor set about
analyzing what the state intended to convey by including a crèche within the
challenged display. The district court had found that the state had intended
to promote religion by including the crèche,42 but Justice O’Connor
disagreed: “When viewed in light of correct legal principles, the District
Court’s finding of unlawful purpose was clearly erroneous.”43
What had been the district court’s error? Justice O’Connor criticized the
district court for its willingness to “ascertain the city’s purpose in displaying
the crèche separate and apart from the general purpose in setting up the
display.”44 Of course, the district court had focused on the crèche because
the challenge had been to its inclusion in particular. Each year, the display
had been assembled anew. The plaintiff was not seeking to enjoin the city
from having a holiday display at all but, instead, was seeking to prevent the
city from including a particular element within that display.
Justice O’Connor did not explain why a specific part of the display
could not be challenged, although some justifications come to mind.
Perhaps she feared that permitting such a challenge would invite challenges
to particular aspects of sculptures or paintings, although those artistic
displays might be distinguishable in that the removal of the challenged part
might be much more difficult. For example, removing a part of a statute
would literally destroy the work.45 Of course, there would be other ways to
prevent a statue from conveying a particular message; for example, one
might try to cover up a part of a display that was deemed offensive.46
However, covering up part of the work might itself be thought to convey a
message; for example, that there was something about that part of the work
in particular that should not be seen. Such a method of altering a message
might be contrasted with changing the composition of a display by including
41. Id.
42. See id.
43. See id.
44. Id.
45. One might have a monument that included both religious and non-religious elements. See
Green v. Haskell Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 568 F.3d 784, 801 (10th Cir. 2009) (discussing monument
which included the Mayflower Compact in addition to the Ten Commandments).
46. See, e.g., Melvin I. Urofsky, The Bull by the Horns: Nadine Strossen, Pornography, and
Free Speech, 41 TULSA L. REV. 677, 680 (2006) (discussing “Attorney General John Ashcroft
hanging drapes over the full-figured, but unfortunately bare-breasted Statue of Justice in, of all
places, the Justice Department”).
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different elements in a particular year.47 There would be nothing contained
in the display itself that would suggest that there had been any controversy
about the elements included within it.
True, someone might well remember that other elements had been
included in previous years, so it should not be thought that the failure to
include something in a display would simply go unnoticed. That said,
however, the failure to include a crèche might well be taken in a different
way than would, for example, covering up a crèche that was part of a
display.
One of the issues at trial was whether the city would have a display at all
if the crèche were not included. The mayor had testified that the display
would be erected without the crèche, if necessary,48 although he also testified
that people would be upset if the crèche were not included.49 Yet, an
important element of the analysis involves why those people would be upset.
There was testimony that the display would serve its commercial purpose of
drawing people downtown even if the crèche were not included,50 and that
inclusion of the crèche added a religious dimension to the display.51 Thus,
the secular purposes for its inclusion were undermined at trial, and there was
strong evidence that its inclusion was motivated by a desire to promote the
religious aspects of Christmas. But if the public outrage at the crèche’s
exclusion was to the state refusal to endorse the majority’s religious beliefs,
then the negative reaction would be to the state refusal to violate the
Constitution.
Justice O’Connor also criticized the district court for finding that the
city’s “use of an unarguably religious symbol ‘raises an inference’ of intent
to endorse.”52 Yet, the district court had not simply said that by using the
crèche the city should be inferred to have intended to endorse a particular
religion. On the contrary, the court referred to a variety of factors that
supported its conclusion. For example, the mayor had implied that not

47. The design might change from year to year. See Donnelly v. Lynch, 525 F. Supp. 1150,
1155 (D.R.I. 1981), aff’d, 691 F.2d 1029 (1st Cir. 1982), rev’d, 465 U.S. 668 (1984) (“Subject to the
final approval of the Director of Parks and Recreation, a City maintenance supervisor designs the
layout of the display. The Mayor may make changes in the layout.”); see also id. at 1155 n.6 (“The
Mayor testified that he had in fact made changes in the display in the past.”).
48. See id. at 1158.
49. Id.
50. See id. at 1159 (discussing testimony that “the nativity scene added ‘absolutely nothing’ to
the impact of the display for commercial purposes”).
51. See id. at 1171 (“The City effectively concedes that the role of the creche in the Hodgson
Park display is to evoke the religious aspect of Christmas.”); see also id. at 1161 (“The most
recurrent comments appearing in over half the letters are that the birth of Christ is the essence of
Christmas, and that the presence of the creche, as a symbol of this spiritual core, is necessary to
preserve the true meaning of the holiday.”).
52. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 691 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
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including the crèche in the Christmas display would “take Christ out of
Christmas.”53 Apparently, many in the community supported including the
crèche in the display because they believed that the city “had a right to
sponsor and support the religious views of the majority.”54 The court further
noted that the city had not taken any steps to minimize or disclaim any
perceived endorsement of religion resulting from inclusion of the crèche.55
The district court’s understated conclusion that one might reasonably infer
an intent to endorse was transformed by Justice O’Connor into an
unwarranted assumption allegedly based on the mere fact of the crèche’s
inclusion.56
The errors mentioned by Justice O’Connor suggest that a court making
use of the endorsement test should not examine whether a particular part of a
display should have been included, but instead should examine the overall
effect of a particular display. If a display includes a crèche, then one might
examine factors such as how big the crèche is57 and where it is placed58 to
determine whether the overall effect of the display is to endorse religion.
Rather than engage in that kind of analysis to determine whether the display
as a whole was intended to endorse religion or, perhaps, would have the
effect of endorsing religion, Justice O’Connor suggested that the “evident
purpose of including the crèche in the larger display was not promotion of
the religious content of the crèche but celebration of the public holiday
through its traditional symbols.”59 Of course, that conclusion was not
evident to the trier of fact, and Justice O’Connor did not point to anything in
the record that would have made the trial court’s contrary conclusion
erroneous as a matter of law.
Justice O’Connor explained: “Celebration of public holidays, which
have cultural significance even if they also have religious aspects, is a
legitimate secular purpose.”60 But, even if the celebration of a public

53. See Donnelly, 525 F. Supp. at 1159.
54. Id. at 1158.
55. See id. at 1172.
56. See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 687–94 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
57. Donnelly, 525 F. Supp. at 1176 (“[V]iewers would not regard the creche as an insignificant
part of the display. It is an almost life sized tableau marked off by a white picket fence.”).
58. Id. at 1176–77 (“[T]he creche is near two of the most enticing parts of the display for
children—Santa’s house and the talking wishing well. Although the Court recognizes that one
cannot see the creche from all possible vantage points, it is clear from the City’s own photos that
people standing at the two bus shelters and looking down at the display will see the creche centrally
and prominently positioned.”).
59. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 691 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
60. Id.
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holiday can serve a legitimate purpose, that hardly means that all
celebrations of public holidays are immunized from constitutional review.
Presumably, the mayor officially participating in the celebration of a
Christmas Mass would not pass muster, even though that might be described
as celebrating a public holiday.61
When discussing the endorsement test, Justice O’Connor made clear
that it was crucial that “a government practice not have the effect of
communicating a message of government endorsement or disapproval of
religion.”62 She emphasized the importance of not making “religion
relevant, in reality or public perception, to status in the political
community.”63 But holding as a matter of law that inclusion of a crèche in a
holiday display could not make religion relevant in the prohibited way
undercut the very test that was being proposed.
Ironically, there had been testimony at trial that the inclusion of the
crèche was viewed with fear,64 because the city’s inclusion of that religious
symbol exemplified “an increasing tendency of various religious groups to
become more political and thereby to impose their views on the larger
society.”65 Others likely grew fearful after witnessing the “intensity of
feelings”66 in response to the suit to remove the crèche from the display.
Apparently, many of those expressing outrage believed the lawsuit
represented “an attack on the presence of religion as part of the community’s
life, an attempt to deny the majority the ability to express publically its
beliefs in a desired and traditionally accepted way.”67
For the court to assess whether the city had intended to promote religion
by including the crèche within the display, it might have needed to examine
the city’s purposes when that display had first been erected forty years
earlier.68 Even if the original purpose had been to promote religion,
however, a separate issue would be whether that was the reason for
continuing the tradition.69 Most of the district court’s focus was on why the

61. See id. at 710 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“Indeed, in its eagerness to approve the crèche, the
Court has advanced a rationale so simplistic that it would appear to allow the Mayor of Pawtucket to
participate in the celebration of a Christmas Mass, since this would be just another unobjectionable
way for the City to ‘celebrate the holiday.’”).
62. Id. at 692 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
63. Id.
64. Donnelly v. Lynch, 525 F. Supp. 1150, 1156 (D.R.I. 1981), aff’d, 691 F.2d 1029 (1st Cir.
1982), rev’d, 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
65. Id.
66. Id. at 1162.
67. Id.
68. See id. at 1158 (noting that the display was an “accepted community tradition for 40 years”).
69. See, e.g., McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 433 (1961) (recognizing the “strongly
religious origin” of Sunday closing laws). The Court also noted, however, that there were current
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city was continuing to mount the display with the crèche included, and the
court held that the city’s continuing to include the crèche had the effect of
promoting religion in violation of Establishment Clause guarantees.70
Justice O’Connor’s willingness to uphold the inclusion of the crèche as
a matter of law is problematic, because such a position is utterly divorced
from actual perceptions. She would have found both that the state could not
intend to endorse religion by including a crèche in a holiday display and that
such a display could not reasonably be thought an endorsement, despite the
findings to the contrary by the trier of fact.71 Her endorsement test would
uphold the inclusion of the crèche in a winter display, even if most of the
members of the community understood the inclusion of the crèche as an
endorsement of a particular religious view. This was not an auspicious
beginning for a test that was claimed to be intrinsically tied to public
perceptions.72
B. The Court Adopts the Endorsement Test
In County of Allegheny v. ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter,73 the
Court employed the endorsement test to strike down the placement of a
crèche on the Grand Staircase of the Allegheny County Courthouse.74
Justice O’Connor’s Lynch concurrence was praised as “provid[ing] a sound
analytical framework for evaluating governmental use of religious
symbols.”75 The test would determine “whether the government’s use of an
object with religious meaning has the effect of endorsing religion.”76 That
effect would be judged in light of the “message that the government’s
practice communicates: the question is ‘what viewers may fairly understand
to be the purpose of the display.’”77

secular justifications for such laws. See id. at 444 (“[A]s presently written and administered, most of
[the Sunday Closing laws], at least, are of a secular rather than of a religious character.”).
70. Donnelly, 525 F. Supp. at 1181 (“This Court finds that by including a nativity scene in its
Christmas display, the City of Pawtucket has violated the Establishment Clause of the
Constitution.”).
71. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 691, 693 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
72. Id. at 692.
73. 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
74. See id. at 621 (noting “the longstanding constitutional principle that government may not
engage in a practice that has the effect of promoting or endorsing religious beliefs” and concluding
that the “display of the crèche in the county courthouse has this unconstitutional effect”).
75. Id. at 595.
76. Id.
77. Id. (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 692 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring)).
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Claiming to apply the endorsement test, the Court explained that no one
could reasonably think that the crèche “occupies this location without the
support and approval of the government.”78 However, pains were taken to
distinguish the constitutionally impermissible crèche at issue in Allegheny
from the constitutionally permissible crèche at issue in Lynch. The latter did
not involve government endorsement.
[B]ecause the crèche is “a traditional symbol” of Christmas, a
holiday with strong secular elements, and because the crèche was
“displayed along with purely secular symbols,” the crèche’s setting
“changes what viewers may fairly understand to be the purpose of
the display” and “negates any message of endorsement” of “the
Christian beliefs represented by the crèche.”79
Yet, it may be instructive to consider some of the other secular symbols
included within the Lynch display: “a Santa Claus house with a live Santa
distributing candy; reindeer pulling Santa’s sleigh; a live 40–foot Christmas
tree strung with lights; [and] statues of carolers in old-fashioned dress.”80
Apparently, these purely secular symbols helped to negate any message of
endorsement that might otherwise have been perceived.
At least one question that should have been addressed is whether a
nonadherent would describe all of these symbols as “purely secular.”81
Consider, for example, the “widely accepted view of the Christmas tree as
the preeminent secular symbol of the Christmas holiday.”82 The implication
is that one would be unreasonable to view the Christmas tree as endorsing a
religious view, even though “Christmas trees once carried religious
connotations.”83 Yet, for some non-Christians, the Christmas tree continues
to carry religious connotations.84
Certainly, it is fair to suggest that merely because something was once a
religious symbol does not guarantee that it will always remain one. But that
observation merely begins the inquiry, because it will then be important to
determine whether the symbol at issue itself has ceased to have a religious
dimension. For example, Justice O’Connor noted that Thanksgiving is now

78. Id. at 599–600.
79. Id. at 596 (citing Lynch, 465 U.S. at 692 (O’Connor, J., concurring)).
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 617.
83. Id. at 616.
84. See Joel S. Jacobs, Endorsement as “Adoptive Action:” A Suggested Definition of, and an
Argument for, Justice O’Connor’s Establishment Clause Test, 22 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 29, 46
(1994) (“While Christmas trees may seem innocuous to those who display them, they retain
Christian symbolism. Christmas trees, as the name suggests, have long had a strong association with
Christianity.”).
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understood as a celebration of patriotic values rather than religious beliefs,85
although it is an empirical question whether atheists, for example, view the
holiday as completely divorced from religious belief.86 She also agreed with
Justice Blackmun that Christmas trees are secular rather than religious,
although she rejected his assertion87 that a menorah has a secular element.88
Justice Brennan rejected in his concurring and dissenting opinion that the
Christmas tree was necessarily secular, suggesting that it may not be “so
seen when combined with other symbols or objects.”89 But the lack of
consensus within the Court itself with respect to which symbols are secular
and which are not suggests that this is a topic about which reasonable
observers might disagree.
Suppose that there was a display with a crèche, a Christmas tree, a Santa
Claus, and a sleigh pulled by reindeer. Some would say that the secular tree,
sleigh and reindeer, and Santa Claus would secularize the crèche.90
However, other observers might reasonably view such a display as
promoting both the religious and non-religious aspects of Christmas.
Certainly, it would be unsurprising for individuals who did not celebrate
Christmas to feel like “outsiders [who were] less than full members of the
political community”91 when they saw the city put on such a display.92 As
Justice Kennedy noted in his concurring and dissenting opinion, an atheist
would reasonably feel like an outsider when the state engages in a number of
differing practices, for example, when an individual recites the Pledge of

85. See Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 631 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
86. See Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952) (suggesting that atheists might have
objections to Thanksgiving because it seems to promote religion).
87. See Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 617 (discussing “the secular component of the message
communicated by other elements of an accompanying holiday display, including the Chanukah
menorah”).
88. See id. at 633 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (discussing
“the religious nature of the menorah and the holiday of Chanukah”).
89. Id. at 639 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
90. See id. at 596 (plurality opinion) (citing Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 692 (1984)
(O’Connor, J., concurring)).
91. Id. at 627 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
92. See id. at 642 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Brennan
stated:
I do not know how we can decide whether it was the tree that stripped the religious
connotations from the menorah, or the menorah that laid bare the religious origins of the
tree. Both are reasonable interpretations of the scene the city presented, and thus both, I
think, should satisfy Justice Blackmun’s requirement that the display “be judged
according to the standard of a ‘reasonable observer.’”
Id.
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Allegiance which, under law, “describes the United States as ‘one Nation
under God.’”93
One of the salient differences among members of the Court involves
their assessments of how a reasonable observer would react to a particular
display. Several views were offered, including that no reasonable observer
would find a Christmas tree to be religious;94 a reasonable observer might
find a Christmas tree to be religious when paired with a menorah;95 a
reasonable person would find a Christmas tree to be religious when paired
with a menorah;96 no reasonable observer would infer religious endorsement
where a religious symbol like a menorah was displayed along with a secular
symbol like a Christmas tree;97 a reasonable observer would find such a
display an endorsement;98 and some reasonable observers would find such a
display to be an endorsement but other reasonable observers would not.99
With such a range of views about what a reasonable observer would or
might say, one might have expected the Court to offer a more complete
analysis of how the endorsement test works. For example, the Court might
have explained whether (1) a state practice violates constitutional guarantees
under the endorsement test as long as a reasonable observer believes that it
promotes or undermines religion, or (2) a state practice passes muster under
the endorsement test as long as a reasonable observer believes that the
practice does not promote or undermine religion. Assuming that the Justices
on the Supreme Court qualify as reasonable observers and that reasonable
observers might disagree about whether a particular practice promotes or
undermines religion, the very practices at issue in Lynch and Allegheny
would fail or pass the test respectively, depending upon which type of
reasoning accurately captures the test.

93. See id. at 672 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
94. Id. at 616 (plurality opinion) (“The Christmas tree, unlike the menorah, is not itself a
religious symbol.”).
95. See id. at 642 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
96. See id. at 654 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
97. Id. at 617–18 (plurality opinion) (“[T]he combination of the tree and the menorah
communicates, not a simultaneous endorsement of both the Christian and Jewish faiths, but instead,
a secular celebration of Christmas coupled with an acknowledgment of Chanukah as a
contemporaneous alternative tradition.”).
98. See id. at 654 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“[T]he presence of the
Chanukah menorah, unquestionably a religious symbol, gives religious significance to the Christmas
tree.”).
99. See id. at 642 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (suggesting that
different interpretations would be reasonable).
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C. When Would a Reasonable Observer Infer Endorsement?
In Capitol Square Review & Advisory Board v. Pinette,100 Justice
O’Connor suggested that one reason that the Justices do not agree about
what a reasonable person would say when viewing a particular display is
that the Justices impute differing levels of knowledge to the reasonable
person.101 At issue in Pinette was whether the denial of a permit to the Ku
Klux Klan to display a Latin cross in Capitol Square in front of the
statehouse offended constitutional guarantees.102 The state of Ohio had
feared that the unattended cross would be inferred to involve official
endorsement of Christianity by the state.103
The Pinette plurality refused to find that the state would be justified in
restricting private expression merely “because an observer might mistake
private expression for officially endorsed religious expression.”104 Instead,
the plurality stated: “Religious expression cannot violate the Establishment
Clause where it (1) is purely private and (2) occurs in a traditional or
designated public forum, publicly announced and open to all on equal
terms.”105 While making clear that the display at issue passed constitutional
muster under the endorsement test, the plurality was not especially clear
about why that was so.
One interpretation of the plurality’s position is that the endorsement test
simply should not be applied if private speech is at issue,106 assuming that
the state has had no hand in encouraging the misunderstanding that the
expression is public speech.107 According to this interpretation, even private
religious speech reasonably perceived as involving a government
endorsement does not fail the endorsement test as long as the state was not

100. 515 U.S. 753 (1995).
101. See id. at 779 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“In my
view, proper application of the endorsement test requires that the reasonable observer be deemed
more informed than the casual passerby postulated by Justice Stevens.”).
102. Id. at 757 (plurality opinion) (“Capitol Square is a 10-acre, state-owned plaza surrounding
the statehouse in Columbus, Ohio.”).
103. Id. at 761.
104. Id. at 763.
105. Id. at 770.
106. See id. at 763 (“We must note, to begin with, that it is not really an ‘endorsement test’ of any
sort, much less the ‘endorsement test’ which appears in our more recent Establishment Clause
jurisprudence, that petitioners urge upon us.”); see also id. at 764 (“The test petitioners propose,
which would attribute to a neutrally behaving government private religious expression, has no
antecedent in our jurisprudence, and would better be called a ‘transferred endorsement’ test.”).
107. See id. at 766 (reasoning that mistaken attribution to the government will not fail the
endorsement test where “government has not fostered or encouraged the mistake”).
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complicit in promoting the misattribution,108 because the endorsement test is
not designed to cover this kind of case.109
A different interpretation of the plurality position is that the
endorsement test is the correct test to use in this kind of case, but as a matter
of law that test cannot be used to invalidate private speech unless the
government somehow promotes the misperception that the speech is
governmental.110 The first interpretation limits the circumstances under
which the endorsement test is applicable, which means that some other test
must be used to determine whether the display at issue violates constitutional
guarantees. In contrast, the second interpretation suggests that the
endorsement test is the appropriate standard by which to determine whether
the display violates constitutional guarantees and further suggests as a matter
of law that the display is permissible because a reasonable person could not
infer endorsement under such circumstances.
Justice O’Connor agreed with the Pinette plurality that, in the particular
case at hand, a “reasonable, informed observer”111 would not impute the
message to the state,112 although she rejected that such an observer could
never misperceive private speech as state endorsement. For example, Justice
O’Connor suggested that in some cases “the presence of a sign disclaiming
government sponsorship or endorsement”113 might be required because the
Establishment Clause “imposes affirmative obligations that may require a
State, in some situations, to take steps to avoid being perceived as
supporting or endorsing a private religious message.”114
Justice O’Connor’s suggestion that the state might be required to post a
disclaimer casts some light on her requirement that the observer be
informed. If the observer were fully informed, she would not need to be told
by the state that the speech at issue was private rather than public. Thus,
Justice O’Connor suggests that a reasonable person need not be fully
informed; else, the (sometimes required) disclaimer would only serve to

108. See id. at 784 (Souter, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“The
plurality’s opinion declines to apply the endorsement test to the Board’s action, in favor of a per se
rule: religious expression cannot violate the Establishment Clause where it (1) is private and (2)
occurs in a public forum, even if a reasonable observer would see the expression as indicating state
endorsement.”).
109. Id. at 764 (plurality opinion) (“Where we have tested for endorsement of religion, the
subject of the test was either expression by the government itself, . . . or else government action
alleged to discriminate in favor of private religious expression or activity . . . .” (citations omitted)).
110. But see id. at 774 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“I
believe that an impermissible message of endorsement can be sent in a variety of contexts, not all of
which involve direct government speech or outright favoritism.”).
111. See id. at 773.
112. See id. at 772.
113. Id. at 776.
114. Id. at 777.
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inform the observer of something she already knows. That said, however,
members of the Court have had some difficulty in specifying just what or
how much the reasonable observer should know before making a judgment
about whether something promotes or undermines religion.
Consider Justice O’Connor’s comment that “[t]here is always someone
who, with a particular quantum of knowledge, reasonably might perceive a
particular action as an endorsement of religion.”115 Her point is well-taken
that the endorsement test cannot be based on whether there exists one
sincere person who, in light of her own level of knowledge, believes that a
particular practice promotes or undermines religion. Yet, it is difficult to tell
whether the emphasis should be on the possibly deficient level of knowledge
or, perhaps, on the fact that only one individual has had the relevant
reaction. For example, suppose that there were several people who, with a
particular quantum of knowledge, believed that a particular action promoted
religion. Would that reaction now be given weight because it was shared by
several people, or would it not be given weight because those having it only
had a particular quantum of knowledge?
An analogous point might be made with respect to the observation that a
state has not “made religion relevant to standing in the political community
simply because a particular viewer of a display might feel uncomfortable.”116
Even assuming that the discomfort is associated with an individual’s
inference that the state is supporting or undermining religion, one cannot tell
whether such discomfort would make religion relevant to standing if shared
by several people or, instead, whether something more must be shown to
establish that standing in the political community had been affected.
Regrettably, Justice O’Connor’s focus is neither on the number of
individuals who might have had a particular idiosyncratic reaction to a
display nor even on whether such individuals misperceived endorsement
because of a lack of awareness of a crucial fact. Justice O’Connor explains
that “the endorsement inquiry is not about the perceptions of particular
individuals or saving isolated nonadherents from the discomfort of viewing
symbols of a faith to which they do not subscribe.”117 Indeed, the
endorsement test does not involve the “the actual perception of individual
observers,”118 because under such an approach “a religious display is

115.
116.
117.
118.

Id. at 780.
Id.
Id. at 779.
Id.
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necessarily precluded so long as some passersby would perceive a
governmental endorsement thereof.”119
Justice O’Connor’s analysis is surprising for a number of reasons. First,
it is false to say that taking account of the actual reactions of individuals
would necessitate invalidating a practice merely because some passersby
found it offensive. Suppose, for example, that one thousand individuals of a
particular faith are surveyed and that two found a particular practice an
endorsement of religion.
All else being equal, it would be quite
understandable for Justice O’Connor to suggest that the relevant test does
not invalidate the practice. There may well be an explanation for these
reactions that does not provide a basis for Establishment Clause concern; for
example, that the survey responses were insincere or involved some
misunderstanding. But refusing to find that the endorsement test invalidates
a practice under those circumstances does not justify refusing to consider
actual reactions at all.
Suppose that a different survey was taken and that a majority of the
community, adherents and nonadherents alike, viewed a particular practice
as endorsing religion. That, one would hope, would suffice to establish the
unconstitutionality of a practice. Regrettably, Justice O’Connor suggests
that even such survey results would not be dispositive, because the
“endorsement inquiry should be conducted from the perspective of a
hypothetical observer who is presumed to possess a certain level of
information that all citizens might not share.”120 After all, Justice O’Connor
would have held as a matter of law that inclusion of a crèche in a holiday
display was not unconstitutional under the endorsement test, regardless of
the actual reactions of the community.121
After a moment’s reflection, one comes to realize that Justice
O’Connor’s endorsement test is much different from what it might initially
have been supposed to be. Justice O’Connor had once emphasized the
importance of not making “religion relevant, in reality or public perception,
to status in the political community,”122 but now suggests that religion being
perceived to be or actually being a factor in one’s status in the political
community does not matter as long as the hypothetical reasonable observer
with the requisite quantum of knowledge (neither too much nor too little)
would not infer endorsement.123

119. Id.
120. Id. at 780.
121. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 694 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
122. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 692.
123. See Pinette, 515 U.S. at 780 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
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Justice Stevens understood the endorsement test somewhat differently.
He argued that it is especially important for the endorsement test to “take
account of the perspective of a reasonable observer who may not share the
particular religious belief it expresses.”124 Of course, not all informed
nonadherents react the same way. For example, some nonadherents did not
believe the crèche at issue in Lynch involved an endorsement of religion,125
whereas others did believe it an endorsement.126 Justice Stevens would not
require unanimity among nonadherents in order to find an Establishment
Clause violation, suggesting that if a “reasonable person could perceive a
government endorsement of religion from a private display, then the State
may not allow its property to be used as a forum for that display.”127 Justice
Stevens offered an example of when endorsement might be perceived: A
reasonable observer of “any symbol placed unattended in front of any capitol
in the world will normally assume that the sovereign—which is not only the
owner of that parcel of real estate but also the lawgiver for the surrounding
territory—has sponsored and facilitated its message.”128
Because a
reasonable person might well perceive endorsement under such
circumstances, the state is precluded from having an unattended religious
symbol in front of the state capitol.129
Justice O’Connor rejected Justice Stevens’s analysis, suggesting that the
reasonable observer about whom he was speaking was less than adequately
informed.130 But if that is the difficulty, there are ways to rectify the
problem. Consider a solution proposed by Justice O’Connor to help inform
the reasonable observer, namely, having the state post a disclaimer so that
the state would not be associated with the message at issue.131 Such a

124. Id. at 799 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
125. See Donnelly v. Lynch, 525 F. Supp. 1150, 1159 (D.R.I. 1981) (“The Mayor noted that at
least one segment of the Jewish community in Pawtucket has called him to express support and to
state that they regard the inclusion of the nativity scene as ‘a thing of joy and not a religious service
or observance of any kind.’”), aff’d, 691 F.2d 1029 (1st Cir. 1982), rev’d, 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
126. See id. at 1157 (“Steven Brown, Executive Director of the ACLU, saw the creche twice in
December, 1980. . . . Like Mr. Donnelly, he regarded it as a religious symbol which, by its inclusion
within the City’s display, represented official sponsorship of a particular religious viewpoint. . . .
Mr. Brown was raised and educated in the Jewish faith.” (footnote and citations omitted)).
127. See Pinette, 515 U.S. at 799 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
128. Id. at 801–02.
129. See id. at 802, 806.
130. See id. at 779 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“In my
view, proper application of the endorsement test requires that the reasonable observer be deemed
more informed than the casual passerby postulated by JUSTICE STEVENS.”).
131. See id. at 776.
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disclaimer would allegedly suffice to persuade the reasonable observer that
the message at issue should not be attributed to the state.132
Yet, there is reason to believe that Justice O’Connor’s remedy of
posting a disclaimer would not have persuaded Justice Stevens or even the
reasonable observer in some circumstances of the state’s non-endorsement
of the message at issue. Justice Stevens would likely suggest that even a
disclaimer would not suffice to establish non-endorsement, because “the
Constitution generally forbids the placement of a symbol of a religious
character in, on, or before a seat of government.”133 For example, in Van
Orden v. Perry,134 the State of Texas had a monument inscribed with the Ten
Commandments on the State Capitol grounds.135 Even if that monument had
included an inscription containing a secular purpose—for example, to
provide guidance to youth and “to combat juvenile delinquency”—Justice
Stevens would have struck down the maintenance of such a monument on
state grounds as unconstitutional.136
Suppose, however, that one does not accept Justice Stevens’s
presumption against placing religious symbols on state grounds, and one
believes that the reasonable observer should decide for oneself whether a
religious display accompanied by a disclaimer should be inferred to be an
endorsement. While the disclaimer might initially seem sufficient for the
state to be able to show that it did not endorse a religious message, a
reasonable observer might not be satisfied with that “quantum of
knowledge.”137 Suppose, for example, that the mayor had explained to the
faithful that the waiver was there because, otherwise, those small, selfish,
objecting nonadherents would deprive the majority of cherished religious
symbols.138 Presumably, a knowledgeable observer who was aware of that
subterfuge might infer endorsement, although Justice O’Connor rejected that
a reasonable observer would infer endorsement in Pawtucket, the mayor’s
comments about his desire to keep Christ in Christmas notwithstanding.139

132. See id. at 776 (discussing the requirement that the state sometimes include a disclaimer to
“make the State’s role clear to the community”).
133. Id. at 806–07 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
134. 545 U.S. 677 (2005).
135. See id. at 681.
136. See id. at 715 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Though the State of Texas may genuinely wish to
combat juvenile delinquency, and may rightly want to honor the Eagles for their efforts, it cannot
effectuate these admirable purposes through an explicitly religious medium.”).
137. Pinette, 515 U.S. at 780 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
138. Cf. Donnelly v. Lynch, 525 F. Supp. 1150, 1158 (D.R.I. 1981) (“[T]he Mayor explained the
public reaction by suggesting that people ‘thought it was very small of anybody to question what had
been accepted by the community’ for so many years ‘as a good thing.’”), aff’d, 691 F.2d 1029 (1st
Cir. 1982), rev’d, 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
139. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
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Part of the appeal of Justice O’Connor’s endorsement test involves its
recognition that no members of the community should feel like second-class
citizens because of their religious beliefs.140 Yet, Justice O’Connor seems
much more concerned about the feelings of the hypothetical observer and
much less concerned that some members of the community might
reasonably and actually feel like insiders and outsiders respectively because
of a particular display.141
In Mitchell v. Helms,142 members of the Court continued the trend in
which they claimed that the reasonable person could only have one view,
lack of consensus on the Court about what a reasonable person would say
notwithstanding. At issue was government funding used to lend educational
material and equipment to public and private schools.143 The difficulty
presented for Establishment Clause purposes was that the equipment in a
parochial school might be used to indoctrinate schoolchildren in religious
matters.144
The Mitchell plurality announced that a reasonable person would not
infer government endorsement, even if the government funded materials
were used to teach children matters of faith.145 “If the religious, irreligious,
and areligious are all alike eligible for governmental aid, no one would
conclude that any indoctrination that any particular recipient conducts has
been done at the behest of the government.”146 The plurality explained: “In
distinguishing between indoctrination that is attributable to the State and
indoctrination that is not, we have consistently turned to the principle of
neutrality, upholding aid that is offered to a broad range of groups or persons
without regard to their religion.”147

140. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“The
Establishment Clause prohibits government from making adherence to a religion relevant in any way
to a person’s standing in the political community.”).
141. See Paula Abrams, The Reasonable Believer: Faith, Formalism, and Endorsement of
Religion, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1537, 1545 (2010) (“Justice O’Connor may be accurate in
concluding that a standard based on the perceptions of adherents and nonadherents increases the
likelihood that government displays of religious symbols would be found to be impermissible
endorsements of religion. If so, the Court should be wary of such displays, not employ an objective
observer standard that purports to value inclusion but ignores dissenting viewpoints.”).
142. 530 U.S. 793 (2000).
143. Id. at 801–02.
144. See id. at 804.
145. Id. at 809.
146. Id.
147. Id.
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At least two difficulties are posed by the Mitchell plurality’s analysis.
First, it misrepresents the past jurisprudence. In many of the previous cases,
the Court invoked neutrality when upholding the provision of aid to both
secular and parochial schools as long as the funds, equipment, or materials
were not used to promote religion.148 The neutrality had been with respect to
the identity of the provider rather than to the nature of the aid.149 For
example, in Board of Education v. Allen,150 the Court upheld the loan of
secular textbooks to parochial school students.151 Indeed, part of the
supporting rationale was that the Court was confident that those approving
of the books could distinguish between secular and sectarian texts and that
only the former would be approved.152 If the Mitchell plurality’s analysis of
neutrality had accurately reflected the Court’s jurisprudence, the Allen Court
would never even have discussed the limitations on the books that would
receive approval.
The reason that the Court in Meek v. Pittenger153 had upheld loaning
textbooks to parochial schools was that the books were secular, citing
Allen.154 However, the Meek Court struck down the provision of other kinds
of materials and equipment, reasoning that “it would simply ignore reality to
attempt to separate secular educational functions from the predominantly
religious role performed by many of Pennsylvania’s church-related
elementary and secondary schools and to then characterize Act 195 as
channeling aid to the secular without providing direct aid to the sectarian.”155
Because the other kinds of materials and equipment could have been used to
promote religious indoctrination, providing them to sectarian schools would
violate constitutional guarantees.156
The same point might have been made about books, namely, that they
too might be used to promote the school’s sectarian mission. However, the

148. See, e.g., Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1947) (approving the dispersion of
government funds to parents of children attending parochial schools where the spending was part of
a “general program under which [the state paid] the fares of pupils attending public and other
schools” because the First Amendment requires “the state to be a neutral in its relations with groups
of religious believers and non-believers”).
149. See id.
150. 392 U.S. 236, 238 (1968).
151. Id. at 245 (“[O]nly secular books may receive approval.”).
152. Id. (“[W]e cannot assume that school authorities, who constantly face the same problem in
selecting textbooks for use in the public schools, are unable to distinguish between secular and
religious books or that they will not honestly discharge their duties under the law.”).
153. 421 U.S. 349 (1975), overruled by Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000).
154. See id. at 361–62 (citing Allen, 392 U.S. at 244–45) (“[T]he record in the case before us, like
the record in Allen, . . . contains no suggestion that religious textbooks will be lent or that the books
provided will be used for anything other than purely secular purposes.”).
155. Id. at 365.
156. Id. at 366.
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Meek Court was reluctant to overrule Allen,157 and thus upheld the provision
of books but struck down the provision of the other materials.
The Meek Court believed that loaning equipment to sectarian schools
might reasonably be viewed as promoting or endorsing religion.158 So, too,
in Wolman v. Walter,159 the Court upheld various programs and services at
parochial schools, precisely because the provision of those programs and
services on site was not likely to result in sectarian indoctrination.160
However, those programs that might lend themselves to sectarian
indoctrination had to be performed off site where it was thought less likely
that the sectarian indoctrination would occur.161
It is debatable whether the Wolman Court was correct in its judgment
with respect to who would be more likely to indoctrinate or whether
indoctrination would be more likely to take place in some locations than in
others.162 Nonetheless, it should at least be clear what the Court in Meek and
Wolman had been trying to do and that the Mitchell plurality’s explication of
neutrality did not accurately reflect the jurisprudence.163 As Justice Souter
pointed out in his Mitchell dissent, the plurality’s usage of “neutrality” did
not reflect how that term had been used in much of the previous case law.164
In her Mitchell concurrence in the judgment, Justice O’Connor
suggested that if a religious school uses aid directly received from the
government to indoctrinate students, then “it is reasonable to say that the
government has communicated a message of endorsement. Because the

157. Cf. Mark Strasser, Repudiating Everson: On Buses, Books, and Teaching Articles of Faith,
78 MISS. L.J. 567, 601 (2009) (“In short, the Meek Court upheld the practice that had already been
upheld in Allen, but struck down the remaining provisions, notwithstanding the Court’s professed
confidence that the materials, equipment, and services at issue were secular and would not be put to
sectarian uses.”).
158. For the suggestion that promotion of religion and endorsement of religion are describing the
same kind of phenomenon, see County of Allegheny v. ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S.
573, 593 (2002) (“Whether the key word is ‘endorsement,’ ‘favoritism,’ or ‘promotion,’ the essential
principle remains the same.”).
159. 433 U.S. 229 (1977), overruled by Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000).
160. See id. at 244 (“The nature of the relationship between the diagnostician and the pupil does
not provide the same opportunity for the transmission of sectarian views as attends the relationship
between teacher and student or that between counselor and student.”).
161. See id. at 247 (“The danger existed there, not because the public employee was likely
deliberately to subvert his task to the service of religion, but rather because the pressures of the
environment might alter his behavior from its normal course. So long as these types of services are
offered at truly religiously neutral locations, the danger perceived in Meek does not arise.”).
162. See Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 817–18 (rejecting the reasoning of Meek and Wolman).
163. See id. at 839 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment) (“[T]he plurality’s rule does not
accurately describe our recent Establishment Clause jurisprudence.”).
164. See id. at 878–84 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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religious indoctrination is supported by government assistance, the
reasonable observer would naturally perceive the aid program as government
support for the advancement of religion.”165 Thus, in Mitchell as well, the
different Justices could not agree about the conditions under which the
reasonable observer would infer endorsement.
So, too, members of the Court in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris166 could not
agree about the conditions under which the reasonable observer would infer
state endorsement of religion. Zelman involved a voucher program in
Cleveland whereby state funds were used to pay tuition at parochial schools
without any limitations on how those funds would be used.167 The majority
suggested that “no reasonable observer would think a neutral program of
private choice, where state aid reaches religious schools solely as a result of
the numerous independent decisions of private individuals, carries with it the
imprimatur of government endorsement.”168
Yet, there were numerous factors that the informed reasonable observer
might have taken into account when making her assessment, for example,
that the amount of the voucher was lower than what various private
nonreligious schools charged in tuition but higher than what various
parochial schools charged.169 That fact might lead a reasonable observer to
infer state promotion of religion, and one obvious way to combat that
appearance of favoritism would be to increase the value of the voucher.170
On the other hand, the reasonable observer would also be aware that states
face a variety of fiscal challenges and that increasing the voucher amount
would have its own drawbacks in a period of ever-growing deficits.171

165. Id. at 843 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
166. 536 U.S. 639 (2002).
167. See id. at 687 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“The money will thus pay for eligible students’
instruction not only in secular subjects but in religion as well, in schools that can fairly be
characterized as founded to teach religious doctrine and to imbue teaching in all subjects with a
religious dimension.”).
168. Id. at 655 (citing Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 398–99 (1983)).
169. Id. at 704–05 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter explained:
[T]he $2,500 cap that the program places on tuition for participating low-income pupils
has the effect of curtailing the participation of nonreligious schools: “nonreligious
schools with higher tuition (about $4,000) stated that they could afford to accommodate
just a few voucher students.” By comparison, the average tuition at participating
Catholic schools in Cleveland in 1999–2000 was $1,592, almost $1,000 below the cap.
Id. (citations omitted).
170. See id. at 706 (“[T]he obvious fix would be to increase the value of vouchers so that existing
nonreligious private and non-Catholic religious schools would be able to enroll more voucher
students, and to provide incentives for educators to create new such schools given that few presently
exist.”).
171. See Randle B. Pollard, Who’s Going to Pick up the Trash?—Using the Build America Bond
Program to Help State and Local Governments’ Cash Deficits, 8 PITT. TAX. REV. 171, 171 (2011)
(“All over the United States, state and local governments are facing increasing revenue deficits due
to the recession.”).
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The reasonable observer of the Cleveland voucher program might also
have taken into account that many parents were sending their children to
schools promoting the views of other faiths, and that these parents were not
doing so because they wanted to expose their children to the views of other
faiths but simply because they did not believe that they had any other
realistic choice.172 Once again, the differing possible reactions of the
reasonable observer could not simply be attributed to their varying quanta of
knowledge but to additional factors as well, for example, how they weighed
the different factors when assessing what message might be inferred.
In Santa Fe Independent School District v Doe,173 the majority again
announced how the reasonable observer would react, despite the
protestations to the contrary by members of the dissent.174 This time,
however, the Court suggested that no reasonable observer would fail to infer
endorsement.175 At issue was a school policy that permitted students to
decide by majority vote whether there would be a solemnizing message at
football games. If so, then there would be a separate vote to decide who
would give that message.176
Members of the Court could not agree about whether a student elected
to offer the football game message would be giving a public or a private
address. The majority suggested that “the members of the listening audience
must perceive the pregame message as a public expression of the views of
the majority of the student body delivered with the approval of the school

172.

See Zelman, 536 U.S. at 704 (Souter, J., dissenting).
Evidence shows, however, that almost two out of three families using vouchers to send
their children to religious schools did not embrace the religion of those schools. The
families made it clear they had not chosen the schools because they wished their children
to be proselytized in a religion not their own, or in any religion, but because of
educational opportunity.
Id. (citation omitted).
173. 530 U.S. 290 (2000).
174. See id. at 324 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
Here, by contrast, the potential speech at issue, if the policy had been allowed to proceed,
would be a message or invocation selected or created by a student. That is, if there were
speech at issue here, it would be private speech. The “crucial difference between
government speech endorsing religion, which the Establishment Clause forbids, and
private speech endorsing religion, which the Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses
protect,” applies with particular force to the question of endorsement.
Id. (citing Bd. of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 250 (1990)).
175. Id. at 308 (majority opinion) (“Regardless of the listener’s support for, or objection to, the
message, an objective Santa Fe High School student will unquestionably perceive the inevitable
pregame prayer as stamped with her school’s seal of approval.”).
176. See id. at 306.
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administration.”177 In contrast, the dissent suggested that the speech at issue
would be “private speech.”178 But the reasonable observer might react quite
differently to public as opposed to private speech involving a religious
message, at least with respect to whether the state was itself endorsing the
articulated view.
One of the best cases to illustrate some of the different ways in which
the endorsement test might be used is Elk Grove Unified School District v.
Newdow179 in which the constitutionality of mandating the Pledge of
Allegiance in primary schools was at issue. The current Pledge is: “I pledge
allegiance to the Flag of the United States of America, and to the Republic
for which it stands, one Nation under God, indivisible, with liberty and
justice for all,”180 and the challenge was to the inclusion of “under God” in
particular.181
The Court explained that the original Pledge did not include the
challenged words,182 but “under God” was later added in 1954.183 In his
concurrence in the judgment, Chief Justice Rehnquist explained that the
individual who sponsored adding those words wanted to “contrast this
country’s belief in God with the Soviet Union’s embrace of atheism.”184
However, Rehnquist pointed out:
To the millions of people who regularly recite the Pledge,
and who have no access to, or concern with, such
legislation or legislative history, “under God” might mean
several different things: that God has guided the destiny of
the United States, for example, or that the United States
exists under God’s authority.185
For purposes here, the relevant issue is what the reasonable observer
would say about the decision to include the words “under God” within the
Pledge, and the reasonable observer would be aware of the intent to
distinguish the theistic United States from the atheistic Soviet Union.
Nonetheless, Justice O’Connor explained that the reasonable observer “fully

177. Id. at 308.
178. Id. at 324 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
179. 542 U.S. 1 (2004).
180. Id. at 7 (quoting 4 U.S.C. § 4 (2006)).
181. Id. at 5 (“Respondent, Michael A. Newdow, is an atheist whose daughter participates in that
daily exercise. Because the Pledge contains the words ‘under God,’ he views the School District’s
policy as a religious indoctrination of his child that violates the First Amendment.”).
182. See id. at 6.
183. See id. at 7.
184. See id. at 25 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment).
185. Id. at 26.
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aware of our national history and the origins of such practices, would not
perceive these acknowledgments [including the Pledge] as signifying a
government endorsement of any specific religion, or even of religion over
nonreligion.”186 She argued that the Pledge “purports only to identify the
United States as a Nation subject to divine authority,”187 although it seems
likely that an atheist would feel like a second-class citizen in such a nation.
Even if the Pledge was merely a state-sanctioned description of the
nation as theistic rather than, for example, as a country where the freedom to
believe or not believe thrives, non-believers might feel like second-class
citizens. Yet, as Justice Thomas pointed out in his Newdow concurrence, a
pledge of allegiance involves more than a mere description of the Nation—it
instead involves a personal affirmation.188 By mandating recitation of the
Pledge, the state might be viewed as promoting or endorsing religion in two
different respects: (1) it gets children to affirm or reaffirm a belief in God,
and (2) it sends a message to believers that they are insiders and to nonbelievers that they are outsiders.
Newdow is helpfully compared to Doe. If Doe involved state
endorsement because the state provided an opportunity for a student speaker
to solemnify a football game,189 then it would seem that the state’s
mandating recitation of the Pledge—which includes an affirmation of God’s
existence and, perhaps, “authority”190—more than suffices to establish state
endorsement. Indeed, one might add to the mix that the recitation of the
Pledge is led by the state’s representative, the teacher,191 rather than by a
student, as was true in Doe.192 So it might be somewhat surprising that
Justice O’Connor was confident that the reasonable observer could not find
the Pledge requirement an endorsement.
The endorsement test as promulgated by Justice O’Connor relied on the
perceptions of the reasonable observer. However, she recognized “the

186. Id. at 36.
187. Id. at 40.
188. See id. at 47 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) (noting that the Pledge involves
“children actually pledging their allegiance”).
189. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 294 (2000).
190. Newdow, 542 U.S. at 40 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
191. See id. at 4–5 (majority opinion) (“Each day elementary school teachers in the Elk Grove
Unified School District (School District) lead their classes in a group recitation of the Pledge of
Allegiance.”).
192. Doe, 530 U.S. at 294. The claim here is not that student-led religious exercises during
school hours would pass constitutional muster. See Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374
U.S. 203 (1963) (striking down student-led prayers in schools).
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dizzying religious heterogeneity of our Nation”193 and was unwilling to rely
on “a subjective approach [that] would reduce the test to an absurdity.”194
After all, the test would simply be unable to distinguish among permissible
and impermissible actions by the state when “[n]early any government
action could be overturned as a violation of the Establishment Clause if a
‘heckler’s veto’ sufficed to show that its message was one of
endorsement.”195
Yet, the heckler discussed by Justice O’Connor is not merely some
individual who interferes with someone else’s exercise of First Amendment
rights. It might instead refer to a reasonable, knowledgeable individual who
sincerely perceives a state practice as promoting or undermining religion.
Further, that “heckler” might not simply be offering an idiosyncratic
reaction, but might instead be reacting in the same way that a host of
adherents and nonadherents react.
Suppose that a whole group of sincere, knowledgeable nonadherents
sincerely believes that a particular state practice makes them into secondclass citizens. Suppose further that a whole group of sincere, knowledgeable
adherents sincerely believes that a particular state practice (rightfully)
privileges that group. Justice O’Connor suggests that such a practice might
nonetheless not involve endorsement, because a hypothetical observer with
the correct quantum of knowledge would allegedly react differently.196 But
this means that the endorsement test might have quite ironic results. Not
only would it permit the state to send a “message to [religious] nonadherents
that they are outsiders, not full members of the political community, and an
accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders, favored members
of the political community,”197 but it would add insult to injury by telling
those religious nonadherents that they were not knowledgeable or
reasonable, but were instead the equivalent of religious hecklers.
The reasonable person might have different reactions to a particular
state practice, and it “blinks reality”198 to claim that all knowledgeable,
reasonable people will agree about whether a particular state practice
promotes or undermines religion. Rather than decide whether Establishment
Clause guarantees are violated or instead respected when some reasonable
observers would infer endorsement and others would not, members of the
Court instead pretend that reasonable observers could not disagree. Such an
approach is especially disappointing, given the numerous cases in which
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
part).
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Newdow, 542 U.S. at 34–35 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
Id. at 35.
Id.
Id. at 35.
Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724, 757 (2008) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
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presumably reasonable members of the Court could not themselves agree
about whether a particular practice constitutes state endorsement.
III. THE POST-O’CONNOR ENDORSEMENT TEST
Justice O’Connor retired in 2006, and indeed, many members of the
Court who contributed to our understanding of the endorsement test’s
evolution are no longer on the Court. Chief Justice Rehnquist was replaced
by Chief Justice Roberts shortly before Justice O’Connor retired, and both
Justice Stevens199 and Justice Souter200 have retired since then. While no
recent case establishes how the endorsement test will fare in the future, two
cases are suggestive with respect to whether and how it might be used.
A. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum
In Pleasant Grove City v. Summum,201 the Court examined a city’s
refusal to install a permanent monument containing the Seven Aphorisms of
Summum in a public park. Because a public park is a traditional public
forum, the Tenth Circuit held that the city had to accept the monument.202
The United States Supreme Court reversed,203 explaining that “the placement
of a permanent monument in a public park is best viewed as a form of
government speech and is therefore not subject to scrutiny under the Free
Speech Clause.”204 Because the Free Speech Clause did not impose
limitations on the power of a city to refuse a donation, the Court held that
the city’s action did not offend constitutional guarantees.205
While noting that the Free Speech Clause imposes no constraints on
governmental speech,206 the Summum Court admitted that “government
speech must comport with the Establishment Clause.”207 The Court then

199. Justice Stevens was replaced by Justice Kagan.
200. Justice Souter was replaced by Justice Sotomayor.
201. 555 U.S. 460 (2009).
202. Id. at 464 (“The Court of Appeals held that the municipality was required to accept the
monument because a public park is a traditional public forum.”).
203. Id. at 481.
204. Id. at 464.
205. See id. at 481 (“[T]he City’s decision is not subject to the Free Speech Clause, and the Court
of Appeals erred in holding otherwise.”).
206. Id. at 467 (“The Free Speech Clause restricts government regulation of private speech; it
does not regulate government speech.” (citing Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 553
(2005))).
207. Summum, 555 U.S. at 468.
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addressed how to interpret the message communicated by a permanent
monument on public property.208
As an initial matter, it might seem surprising that the Court discussed
how to interpret the message communicated by a monument for
Establishment Clause purposes. After all, the city had rejected a donation
and thus did not have to worry about what message would have been
communicated by such a monument.209 Further, the refusal of a donation
might be for any number of reasons including, for example, a lack of
space210 or a judgment that the donation was not aesthetically pleasing or in
some other way not promoting city interests.211 Because what was at issue
was the rejection of the donation of a monument rather than the acceptance
and installation of a monument, much of the Summum opinion seemed
unrelated to the issue before the Court.212
Nonetheless, the Court decided to offer a long disquisition on the
messages sent by monuments, presumably because of the city’s prior
acceptance of a Ten Commandments monument in that same park. The
Court described the difficulty in determining the message communicated by
a monument, explaining that “it frequently is not possible to identify a single
‘message’ that is conveyed by an object or structure, and consequently, the
thoughts or sentiments expressed by a government entity that accepts and
displays such an object may be quite different from those of either its creator
or its donor.”213 Thus, even if a creator or donor has a religious message,
that would not suffice to establish that the state’s message is also religious.214
Further, the state’s message may change over time, for example, because of
the new monuments that might be erected nearby.215 Thus, it may not be

208. Id. at 469.
209. Id. at 466.
210. See id. at 478 (“[P]ublic parks can accommodate only a limited number of permanent
monuments.”).
211. See id. at 484 (Breyer, J., concurring) (“[C]ities use park space to further a variety of
recreational, historical, educational, esthetic, and other civic interests.”).
212. Commentators have manifested their disapproval of the Summum Court’s reasoning. See
Steven G. Gey, Why Should the First Amendment Protect Government Speech When the Government
Has Nothing to Say?, 95 IOWA L. REV. 1259, 1302 (2010) (“Sloppy, and ultimately incoherent,
opinions such as the Supreme Court’s majority effort in Summum do little more than confuse First
Amendment jurisprudence and encourage official misconduct using the government speech doctrine
as a cloak.”).
213. Summum, 555 U.S. at 476.
214. See id. (“By accepting a privately donated monument and placing it on city property, a city
engages in expressive conduct, but the intended and perceived significance of that conduct may not
coincide with the thinking of the monument’s donor or creator.”).
215. See id. at 477 (“The message that a government entity conveys by allowing a monument to
remain on its property may also be altered by the subsequent addition of other monuments in the
same vicinity.”).
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possible to ascertain the message that a state monument is intended to
convey.
One possible way to clear up any confusion about an intended message
is to have a state entity announce the message that the monument is
supposed to communicate or, in the alternative, include a disclaimer so that
observers do not misperceive the relevant message. While a city could
decide to declare its own interpretation of a monument’s message, the Court
rejected that a city is constitutionally required to make such a declaration.216
Of course, the Court did not need to address this issue insofar as it was
addressing the constitutionality of the city’s refusing to accept the Seven
Aphorisms monument, and presumably was instead rejecting the necessity
of the city’s explaining the message communicated by the monument of the
Ten Commandments that had been accepted.
The difficulty posed for the city was not in fashioning some official
message that would have shielded a Ten Commandments monument from an
Establishment Clause challenge. Van Orden v. Perry217 establishes that the
government can have a permanent monument of the Ten Commandments in
a park without offending constitutional guarantees.218 The particular
difficulty posed in Summum involved the city’s having accepted a Ten
Commandments monument and having rejected a Summum monument of
similar size,219 which might at least seem to send a message of endorsement
of one religion over another.220 The city’s communication of that message
would violate Establishment Clause guarantees.221

216. Id. at 473 (rejecting the proposal that “a government entity accepting a privately donated
monument . . . go through a formal process of adopting a resolution publicly embracing ‘the
message’ that the monument conveys”).
217. 545 U.S. 677 (2005).
218. See id. at 692 (“We cannot say that Texas’ display of this monument violates the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.”).
219. See Summum, 555 U.S. at 465 (“Summum’s president wrote a letter to the City’s mayor
requesting permission to erect a ‘stone monument,’ which would contain ‘the Seven Aphorisms of
SUMMUM’ and be similar in size and nature to the Ten Commandments monument.”).
220. But see id. at 482–83 (Scalia, J., concurring) (suggesting that Van Orden is dispositive with
respect to the constitutionality of the Ten Commandments display in Pleasant Grove). See also
Bernadette Meyler, Summum and the Establishment Clause, 104 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 95, 97
(2009) (“Justice Scalia concluded that the decision in Van Orden would preclude any finding that
Pleasant Grove had violated the Establishment Clause.”).
221. See Patrick M. Garry, Pleasant Grove City v. Summum: The Supreme Court Finds a Public
Display of the Ten Commandments to Be Permissible Government Speech, 2009 CATO SUP. CT.
REV. 271, 282 (“An argument could be made that the Establishment Clause forbids any
governmental preference for one religious sect over another, and that such favoritism was evident in
Pleasant Grove’s refusal to display the Seven Aphorisms while continuing to display the Ten
Commandments.”).
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While the installation and maintenance of permanent monuments by a
city does send a message, the Summum Court made clear the possible
difficulty in capturing the content of the message sent.222 But this suggests
that a variety of messages might reasonably be inferred to be sent by a
public monument, which elevates the importance of determining whether the
endorsement test invalidates a state practice if it might reasonably be
inferred to be endorsing religion or, instead, does not invalidate a practice as
long as the practice might reasonably be inferred not to be promoting or
undermining religion. Regrettably, the most recent decision in which the
endorsement test played a role did not make clear which, if either, of these
understandings of the endorsement test is accurate.
B. Salazar v. Buono
At issue in Salazar v. Buono223 was the constitutionality of Congress’s
decision to transfer ownership to a private party of a particular tract of land
and the cross that had been built on it.224 However, an understanding of
Salazar requires a little background.
A cross was erected on federal land to honor soldiers who died in World
War I serving their country.225 The cross had been a gathering point for
Easter services since it was built.226 Frank Buono challenged the continued
maintenance of the cross as a violation of Establishment Clause
guarantees.227 The district court ruled in Buono’s favor.228 That decision
was appealed.229
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower court ruling, finding that “a
reasonable observer would perceive a cross on federal land as governmental
endorsement of religion.”230 However, by the time that the Ninth Circuit had
reached that conclusion, Congress had already passed a land-transfer statute
that would transfer the land to a private party in exchange for other land.231

222. See Summum, 555 U.S. at 473–76 (explaining that some observers might interpret a message
one way while other observers might interpret the message differently).
223. 130 S. Ct. 1803 (2010).
224. Id. at 1811 (“The Court is asked to consider a challenge, not to the first placement of the
cross or its continued presence on federal land, but to a statute that would transfer the cross and the
land on which it stands to a private party.”).
225. See id.
226. See id. at 1812.
227. See id.
228. See id.
229. See id.
230. Id. at 1813 (citing Buono v. Norton, 371 F.3d 543, 549–50 (9th Cir. 2004)).
231. See id.
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The Ninth Circuit did not address the constitutionality of the land-transfer
statute.232
After the Ninth Circuit had issued its decision that the cross on federal
lands violated constitutional guarantees, the plaintiff returned to district
court to prevent the land transfer.233 The district court concluded that “the
transfer was an attempt by the Government to keep the cross atop Sunrise
Rock and so was invalid,”234 which was affirmed on appeal by the Ninth
Circuit.235 The Ninth Circuit decision was appealed to the United States
Supreme Court.236
The case at hand involved a “delicate problem.”237 The plurality pointed
out that on the one hand the cross could not be maintained on federal land
without violating the injunction issued by the district court and, on the other,
the Government “could not remove the cross without conveying disrespect
for those the cross was seen as honoring.”238
Of course, many cases involve “delicate” matters, and it would be
unsurprising for individuals to care deeply about memorials for former
family members or for individuals who died serving their country. But
regrettable negative reactions notwithstanding, the Court must not refrain
from enforcing Establishment Clause guarantees.
One of the questions at hand was whether Establishment Clause
guarantees had been violated. The district court had held that a reasonable
person would infer endorsement,239 and the Ninth Circuit had agreed.240 The
plurality noted that the Government had not appealed the decision, making
the Ninth Circuit’s decision final,241 although the plurality implied that it
would have reached a different result. For example, the plurality announced:
“Placement of the cross on Government-owned land was not an attempt to
set the imprimatur of the state on a particular creed. Rather, those who
erected the cross intended simply to honor our Nation’s fallen soldiers.”242
Thus, one infers the plurality would have upheld the placement of the cross

232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.

See id.
See id.
See id. at 1814 (citing Buono v. Norton, 364 F. Supp. 2d 1175, 1182 (C.D. Cal. 2005)).
See id. (citing Buono v. Kempthorne, 502 F.3d 1069 (9th Cir. 2007)).
See id.
See id. at 1821 (Alito, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
Id. at 1817 (plurality opinion).
See id. at 1812.
See id. at 1813.
See id.
Id. at 1816–17.
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on federal land under the first prong of Lemon.243 With respect to the effect
prong, the plurality noted that the “goal of avoiding governmental
endorsement does not require eradication of all religious symbols in the
public realm.”244 Here, the plurality may have been suggesting that the cross
neither would have had a prohibited effect nor would have been inferred to
involve government endorsement. Or, perhaps, the plurality was implying
that the installation and maintenance of the cross passed the Lemon test and
that the endorsement test should not have been used.
That said, given the posture of the case, the plurality did not need to
address whether the maintenance of the cross on federal land violated
constitutional guarantees.245 That issue was settled. Instead, the issue before
the Court was whether the land-transfer act was constitutional.246 With
respect to that issue, the plurality did not imply that the Lemon test should
have been used. On the contrary, the plurality chided the district court for
analyzing the land-transfer in light of “its suspicion of an illicit
governmental purpose”247 instead of using the endorsement test.248
These mixed signals about which test to use were themselves
unfortunate.
A further difficulty involved the plurality’s implicit
understanding of the factors that would be taken into account by the
objective observer. The plurality seemed unconcerned that all of the factors
that might lead a court to infer illicit purpose would also have been
considered by the knowledgeable, reasonable observer. For example, the
district court noted that the government had “reserved the right to reassert
ownership and repossess the subject property any time the Secretary of the
Interior makes the discretionary determination that the VFW is not
adequately maintaining the Latin cross as a World War I memorial.”249
Further, rather than sell the land to the highest bidder, the government had
restricted the possible recipient to the “organization (VFW) that originally
installed the cross and desires its continued presence in the Preserve.”250 The
district court also noted that “the private land being exchanged for the
federal property is owned by a couple (Mr. and Mrs. Sandoz) who has

243. See supra notes 18–24 and accompanying text (discussing the Lemon test and endorsement).
244. Salazar, 130 S. Ct. at 1818.
245. See supra note 241 and accompanying text.
246. See Salazar, 130 S. Ct. at 1815–16.
247. Id. at 1819.
248. See id. (“Given the sole reliance on perception as a basis for the 2002 injunction, one would
expect that any relief grounded on that decree would have rested on the same basis. But the District
Court enjoined the land transfer on an entirely different basis: its suspicion of an illicit governmental
purpose.”).
249. Buono v. Norton, 364 F. Supp. 2d 1175, 1179 (C.D. Cal. 2005), aff’d sub nom. Buono v.
Kempthorne, 527 F.3d 758 (9th Cir. 2008), rev’d sub nom. Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803
(2010).
250. Id. at 1180.
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actively sought to keep the Latin cross on Sunrise Rock.”251 After
considering these factors, the court concluded that the “government has
engaged in herculean efforts to preserve the Latin Cross on federal land and
that the proposed transfer of the subject property can only be viewed as an
attempt to keep the Latin cross atop Sunrise Rock without actually curing
the continuing Establishment Clause violation by Defendants.”252 But a
reasonable observer might well take these factors into account when
deciding whether the government was endorsing one religion over others.
Needless to say, the plurality’s understanding of these events differed
significantly from the district court’s. For example, the plurality noted that
the purpose of the injunction was to “address the impression conveyed by
the cross on federal, not private, land.”253 But, the plurality reasoned, “that
purpose would favor—or at least not oppose—ownership of the cross by a
private party rather than by the Government.”254 After all, no one would
claim state endorsement merely because a private party had erected and
maintained a cross, and the plurality expressly noted that the endorsement
test tends not to be used with respect to displays on private property.255
Yet, it is one thing for an individual to display a religious symbol on her
own land, and quite another for an individual to continue to display a
religious object on “private” land acquired from the government when the
government retains a reversionary interest in the land such that the
government will regain title to the land if the private owner takes down the
religious display. A reasonable observer who knew of all of the conditions
of the transfer might infer government endorsement of religion, assuming
that the observer believed the cross a religious symbol.

251. Id.
252. Id. at 1182. Some commentators suggest that this restriction on who could own the land
posed the greatest Establishment Clause difficulty. See Christopher Lund, Salazar v. Buono and the
Future of the Establishment Clause, 105 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 60, 67 (2010) (“But the bigger
problem was that Congress decided to sell the land to the VFW without entertaining other suitors.”).
However, it is not clear why the government’s inclusion of the reversion condition does not pose at
least as great a difficulty, especially because this condition might be thought to undermine the
contention that the government ever lost control of the property. See Buono, 364 F. Supp. 2d at 1179
(“Such a reversionary clause defeats Defendants’ contention that the government has given up
control over the subject property.”).
253. Salazar, 130 S. Ct. at 1819.
254. Id.
255. Id. (“As a general matter, courts considering Establishment Clause challenges do not inquire
into ‘reasonable observer’ perceptions with respect to objects on private land.”).
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Some commentators suggest that a cross simply cannot be understood as
a secular object.256 However, the plurality explained that “a Latin cross is
not merely a reaffirmation of Christian beliefs.”257 In addition, it “is a
symbol often used to honor and respect those whose heroic acts, noble
contributions, and patient striving help secure an honored place in history for
this Nation and its people,”258 as if the symbol ceases to be religious when
honoring the dead.
Justice Alito noted in his concurring opinion that the cross is “the
preeminent symbol of Christianity.”259 However, he believed that the “the
original reason for the placement of the cross was to commemorate
American war dead,”260 which allegedly would not involve endorsement.
Justice Alito understood that not all who died fighting for this country were
Christian and even suggested that adding other religious symbols might
dilute the appearance of endorsement of a particular religion,261 implicitly
acknowledging how someone might infer endorsement. But, he reasoned,
the plaintiff would not have been satisfied even if additional religious
symbols had been added, because that would likely have been found to be an
endorsement of religion over nonreligion.262 Justice Alito did not address
whether there would be ways to memorialize those who gave up their lives
fighting for this country in World War I without using a religious symbol.263
This is simply amazing reasoning. Justice Alito seems to recognize that
the cross is a religious symbol and that inclusion of other religious symbols
might negate some of the perception that the State was preferring one
religion over others.264 However, because inclusion of other religious
symbols would do nothing to undermine the perception that the state was
preferring religion over nonreligion, that remedy would not have sufficed.
Fair enough. Because the Establishment Clause precludes preferring one
religion over others and religion over nonreligion as a general matter, the

256. See Lund, supra note 252, at 65 (“The cross can have no secular meanings independent of its
religious meaning.”).
257. Salazar, 130 S. Ct. at 1820.
258. Id.
259. Id. at 1822 (Alito, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
260. Id.
261. See id. at 1823 (“One possible solution would have been to supplement the monument on
Sunrise Rock so that it appropriately recognized the religious diversity of the American soldiers who
gave their lives in the First World War.”).
262. See id. (“But Congress may well have thought—not without reason—that the addition of yet
another religious symbol would have been unlikely to satisfy the plaintiff, his attorneys, or the lower
courts that had found the existing monument to be unconstitutional on the ground that it
impermissibly endorsed religion.”).
263. See id. at 1828 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“I certainly agree that the Nation should
memorialize the service of those who fought and died in World War I, but it cannot lawfully do so
by continued endorsement of a starkly sectarian message.”).
264. Id. at 1823 (Alito, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
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State will not escape the Clause’s strictures by favoring several religions.
But this suggests that maintaining the cross without other symbols of course
violates Establishment Clause guarantees rather than that maintaining the
cross alone would be permissible.
Not only did Justice Alito suggest that the land transfer did not offend
endorsement guarantees, but he suggested in addition that the failure to
maintain the cross would be inferred to undermine religion.265 He noted that
the “demolition of this venerable if unsophisticated, monument would also
have been interpreted by some as an arresting symbol of a Government that
is not neutral but hostile on matters of religion and is bent on eliminating
from all public places and symbols any trace of our country’s religious
heritage.”266 Presumably, Justice Alito is not merely making this point to
suggest that some would react negatively, but is further suggesting that this
would be a reasonable response and thus that the government’s ordering the
destruction of this “nonreligious” symbol honoring the dead267 would itself
fail the endorsement test. But this use of the endorsement test would seem
to indicate that Establishment Clause guarantees would be violated no matter
what the government did—retaining the cross would be viewed by some
reasonable observers as endorsing Christianity and taking down the symbol
would be viewed by some as hostility to Christianity in particular or,
perhaps, religion more generally.268
The claim here is not that Justice Alito is adding a new twist to
endorsement jurisprudence by discussing how particular state actions might
be viewed as hostile to religion. For example, in Good News Club v. Milford
Central School,269 the Court held that a school could not prevent a Christian
club from meeting after school at the same time that other school clubs met.
The school had denied the club permission to use school grounds because
the school viewed the activities of the club as “the equivalent of religious
worship.”270 The Good News Club Court rejected that children would
perceive the school’s permitting the club to meet after school as
endorsement.271 In addition, the Court noted that even if it “were to inquire
into the minds of schoolchildren in this case, we cannot say the danger that

265. Id.
266. Id.
267. See supra note 260 and accompanying text.
268. See Salazar, 130 S. Ct. at 1822–23 (Alito, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
269. 533 U.S. 98 (2001).
270. Id. at 103.
271. See id. at 118.
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children would misperceive the endorsement of religion is any greater than
the danger that they would perceive a hostility toward the religious
viewpoint if the Club were excluded from the public forum.”272
Here, the Court is suggesting that an observer would be incorrect in
perceiving the state’s permitting prayer in clubs after school as
endorsement.273 But the Court is also suggesting that an observer might
correctly perceive the failure to permit such a club as hostility to religion.274
Basically, the Good News Club Court implied that the failure to permit the
after-school student club that engaged in religious worship would violate
Establishment Clause guarantees, just as Justice Alito implied that taking
down the cross would violate Establishment Clause guarantees.275
If taking down the cross would violate Establishment Clause guarantees
and permitting the cross to remain on federal lands would violate the district
court’s order, then Congress’s compromise might seem ideal and, in fact,
Justice Alito praised the decision reached by Congress: “Congress chose an
alternative approach that was designed to eliminate any perception of
religious sponsorship stemming from the location of the cross on federally
owned land, while at the same time avoiding the disturbing symbolism
associated with the destruction of the historic monument.”276 Yet, Justice
Alito did not address some of the implications of his opinion. Consider the
observer who characterizes the Government as hostile to religion because it
is “bent on eliminating from all public places and symbols any trace of our
country’s religious heritage.”277 Such an observer might also be offended by
Congress’s transferring ownership of the land on which the cross was
located so that all traces of religious heritage on public lands could be
eliminated. But this suggests that the land transfer violates Establishment
Clause guarantees by manifesting hostility toward religion.
The crucial question for endorsement purposes involves the reaction of
“the hypothetical construct of an objective observer who knows all of the
pertinent facts and circumstances surrounding the symbol and its
placement.”278 Consider the reasonable, informed observer who knows that
Congress assured that the individual acquiring ownership of the land was in
favor of keeping the cross and that the land would revert to the government

272. Id. (emphasis added).
273. See id. (noting the possibility that someone would “misperceive the endorsement of
religion”).
274. See id. (noting the possibility that someone would perceive rather than misperceive the
refusal to permit the club as hostility).
275. See id.
276. Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803, 1823 (2010) (Alito, J., concurring in part and concurring
in the judgment).
277. Id.
278. Id. at 1819–20 (plurality opinion).
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were the cross taken down. As Justice Stevens points out in his dissent, such
an observer might well find that the state is bending over backwards to
assure the continued display of a paradigmatic religious symbol.279 One
infers from Justice Alito’s comments that a different reasonable observer
might view Congress’s transferring ownership of the land as manifesting
hostility to the public acknowledgment of religious heritage. Still another
reasonable observer might adopt Justice Alito’s view that the “transfer
represents an effort by Congress to address a unique situation and to find a
solution that best accommodates conflicting concerns.”280
Salazar suggests that some reasonable observers might view the land
transfer as endorsement while others would not. Other observers would
view dismantling the cross as hostility towards religion, while still other
observers might view Congress’s compromise whereby ownership was
transferred as itself involving hostility to religion. The use of the
endorsement test in Salazar reflects the way that the endorsement test was
used while Justice O’Connor was on the Court—presumably reasonable
people reach opposite conclusions about which state actions violate
constitutional guarantees.281
C. What Do Summum and Salazar Suggest About the Future of the
Endorsement Test?
Summum suggests that it may be difficult in particular cases to identify
the message conveyed by a particular display. That point, while true, is
neither particularly surprising nor significant in itself.282 For purposes here,
the question is how this observation will fit into the endorsement test
jurisprudence.
Some commentators claim that the endorsement test will only invalidate
a practice if a reasonable observer would necessarily infer endorsement.283

279. See id. at 1833 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[T]he transfer continues the existing government
endorsement of the cross because the purpose of the transfer is to preserve its display. Congress’
intent to preserve the display of the cross maintains the Government’s endorsement of the cross.”).
280. Id. at 1824 (Alito, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
281. See, e.g., County of Allegheny v. ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 620
(1989) (applying Justice O’Connor’s endorsement test and noting that whether an effect is
constitutional “must also be judged according to the standard of a ‘reasonable observer’”).
282. See Gey, supra note 212, at 1301 (“This discussion was apparently intended to demonstrate
the obvious propositions that monuments may convey different messages to different people, and
that these messages may change with time. All of this is true, and entirely beside the point.”).
283. See Lisa Shaw Roy, Pleasant Grove City v. Summum: Monuments, Messages, and the Next
Establishment Clause, 104 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 280, 286 (2010) (“The endorsement test, on
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But that cannot be, because it will almost always be possible for a
reasonable observer to claim no endorsement.
Many of the cases involving endorsement involved dissenting opinions.
Sometimes, some members of the Court rejected the majority view that there
was endorsement, whereas at other times some members of the Court
rejected the dissenting view that there was endorsement. But if the test only
invalidates a practice when no reasonable person would deny endorsement,
then these cases should have been unanimous, at least with respect to
endorsement. Assuming that members of the Court believe each other
sincere, knowledgeable, and reasonable, they should admit that not all
reasonable, knowledgeable observers would find the practice an
endorsement (because some on the Court did not), and thus that the
endorsement test had not been met. If, however, the endorsement test
invalidates a practice as long as a reasonable person might have inferred
state endorsement of religion, then many of the opinions should have been
unanimous, at least with respect to whether the endorsement test required
invalidation, because a reasonable person would have inferred endorsement.
Admittedly, unanimity with respect to the implications of the
endorsement test would not assure unanimity in result. For example, a
Justice might suggest that the endorsement test would require invalidation of
a particular state practice but that the practice at issue was nonetheless
permissible because the endorsement test was not the applicable test.284
Someone reading the Summum opinion might have inferred that Justice
Alito was laying the groundwork for a modified endorsement test. In
Summum, he suggests that there are many reasonable interpretations of
government messages.285 Assuming that the individuals offering these
reasonable interpretations are sincere and knowledgeable, then the
recognition that there might be multiple reasonable reactions to a display
might have important implications. For example, it might mean, following
Justice Stevens, that as long as a reasonable nonadherent believes a display

the other hand, requires a judge to discern a single, identifiable message of exclusion conveyed by a
monument to the reasonable observer.”); Mary Jean Dolan, Salazar v. Buono: The Cross Between
Endorsement and History, 105 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 42, 51–52 (2010) (“Any assertion that the
endorsement test is not dead yet must confront the claim that it was effectively killed off in Pleasant
Grove City v. Summum. The basis for this claim is a meandering passage in Summum in which
Justice Alito, writing for the Court, seemed to suggest in dicta that any monument could mean
anything to anyone.”).
284. For example, Justice Thomas has suggested that certain practices are constitutional, past
precedent notwithstanding, because the precedent was incorrect. See Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v.
Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 49 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) (“I conclude that, as a matter of
our precedent, the Pledge policy is unconstitutional. I believe, however, that Lee was wrongly
decided.”).
285. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 476–77 (2009).
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to be endorsing religion, the state cannot maintain that display.286 That said,
Justice Alito may have had a different position in mind, since his discussion
of the multiple reasonable interpretations of a state display might be a
prelude to the position that as long as a reasonable informed individual
would not infer endorsement, the endorsement test will not invalidate the
display.287
Salazar offers somewhat mixed messages regarding the endorsement
test. Justice Kennedy and Chief Justice Roberts implied that the land
transfer at issue should not have been inferred to be an endorsement,288
although the case was remanded for reconsideration.289 Justice Alito would
not have even remanded the case and would instead have simply upheld the
transfer.290
It is simply unclear whether Justice Alito believed that the transfer
passed muster because a reasonable observer might have believed this did
not involve endorsement (even though a different observer would have
inferred endorsement) or because no reasonable observer would have
inferred endorsement (even though there were members of the Court with a
different view). The former would involve a new, very forgiving
endorsement test, which would not invalidate a state action as long as a
reasonable observer would not view it as involving an endorsement. The
latter would be the same endorsement test that has been used in the past,
where some members of the Court implicitly suggest that their colleagues
are not reasonable, knowledgeable, or, perhaps, sincere.
Neither
understanding of endorsement seems likely to prevent nonadherents from
feeling like outsiders in their political communities.

286. See supra notes 124–28 and accompanying text.
287. In a much different context, Justice Alito suggested that state action would not violate
constitutional guarantees as long as a reasonable person might have made a particular inference. See
Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 422 (2007) (Alito, J., concurring) (“I join the opinion of the Court
on the understanding that (1) it goes no further than to hold that a public school may restrict speech
that a reasonable observer would interpret as advocating illegal drug use . . . .”).
288. Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803, 1819–20 (2010) (“[I]t is not clear that Buono’s claim is
meritorious. That test requires the hypothetical construct of an objective observer who knows all of
the pertinent facts and circumstances surrounding the symbol and its placement.”); see also id. at
1819 (“The injunction was issued to address the impression conveyed by the cross on federal, not
private, land. Even if its purpose were characterized more generally as avoiding the perception of
governmental endorsement, that purpose would favor—or at least not oppose—ownership of the
cross by a private party rather than by the Government.”).
289. See id. at 1821.
290. See id. at 1821 (Alito, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
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IV. CONCLUSION
Commentators have suggested that the endorsement test may have
retired along with Justice O’Connor.291 That suggestion does not seem
plausible if only because members of the Court continue to invoke the test.292
It is fair to suggest that the test may undergo revision, although that
requires an analysis both of what it was and what it has become. While
Justice O’Connor initially trumpeted the importance of not making religious
minorities feel like outsiders and second-class citizens, both her explication
and her application of the test would sometimes permit exactly what she
claimed the test was designed to prohibit.293 Indeed, the test might not only
permit individuals to feel like outsiders because they might reasonably
perceive state endorsement of religious practices contrary to their faith, but it
might aggravate those feelings because the nonadherents were implicitly
being branded as lacking knowledge or, perhaps, as being insincere hecklers
when they voiced their own sincere perceptions.
Even while Justice O’Connor was on the Court, the reasonable person’s
view was offered to establish that a particular practice did or did not involve
endorsement, even though presumed reasonable, knowledgeable members of
the Court would have inferred that the reasonable observer would have
reached a contrary result. That same tendency has been reflected more
recently even after Justice O’Connor’s retirement.
It seems likely that the post-O’Connor Court will continue to use the
endorsement test, perhaps explicitly suggesting that the test will invalidate a
practice only if no reasonable person could fail to infer endorsement or
perhaps suggesting that no reasonable person would infer endorsement, even
in the face of claims to the contrary by members of the Court. The test that
once seemed to have great promise, because it tried to prevent nonadherents
from feeling like second-class citizens, has all too often been used, not only
to validate practices that are reasonably viewed as endorsing religion over
nonreligion or one religion over others, but also to undermine the validity of
the perceptions of those who perceive endorsement. But that is nothing new.
The endorsement test, a cause for celebration because of its recognition that
this country stands for religious liberty, continues to be a source of sorrow.
It claims to be concerned about religious endorsement while refusing to
acknowledge the manifold ways in which certain religions are privileged

291. Some have suggested that the endorsement test should not be used when analyzing whether
government speech violates Establishment Clause guarantees. See Scott W. Gaylord, Licensing
Facially Religious Government Speech: Summum’s Impact on the Free Speech and Establishment
Clauses, 8 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 315, 392–96 (2010) (“[T]he endorsement test does not apply to
government speech . . . .”).
292. See, e.g., Salazar, 130 S. Ct. 1803; Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460 (2009).
293. See supra notes 21–22 and accompanying text.
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over others,294 or in which religion is preferred over nonreligion. To pretend
that nonadherents cannot reasonably perceive endorsement and feel like
outsiders when confronting certain (allegedly constitutional) state practices
is only adding insult to injury, a result countenanced under the endorsement
test both while Justice O’Connor was on the Court and since her retirement.

294. See Caroline Mala Corbin, Ceremonial Deism and the Reasonable Religious Outsider, 57
UCLA L. REV. 1545, 1575 (2010) (“[U]nless all citizens of a country are Jewish or Christian, a
government invocation of God is sectarian.”).
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